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THE THOUGHT OF SOCRATES.
BY WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD.
EVERY exposition of Greek thought, from the most pedantic to
the most popular, has been divided into the two chapters: "Be-
fore Socrates," "After Socrates" ; between which has stood a third,,
devoted to Socrates himself. Though he published no book in prose
or verse, no philosophic hexameters on nature, no dialectic treat-
ise on the Absolute, no criticism on ethics, politics, or the divinities
that shape or refuse to shape the ends of man, his centrality to the
development of speculation, as the mind which, while itself indiffer-
ent to the activities of its predecessors, brought to light other prin-
ciples not only directive for thought in hitherto uncharted realms,
but essential for any rational solution of those problems al-
ready broached, has been until very recently beyond all dispute,
and will always in any case challenge disproof. And the importance
of his practical wisdom for the unwritten history of conduct is
presumably quite as great. Thus we are now face to face with one
of the five or six most impressive and vital questions in the history
of intelligence (as opposed to the history of human vanities and
insanities—the rise and fall of dynasties and the interminable
slaughters on land and sea) : just what did this man stand for who
lived so long ago under the hill temple-crowned, in the market-place
girded by porticoes, within the walls against which even then the
hostile armies were more than once encamped?
The question is difficult not alone because it is so much larger
than every writer who would answer it ; but because it is just here
that our sources are so difficult and confusing. Biographical re-
ports, when uncontaminated by miraculous elements or by suspicion
of rhetorical purpose or partisanship, when squaring with the public
customs and affairs of the times, and finally, when tending toward
a consistent portrayal of character and conduct, we may trust, in
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default of any contrary evidence. Allowing for some possible am-
biguities of imperfect expression, I suppose no scholar would seri-
ously quarrel with the statements of the preceding chapter, as not
being founded on serviceable authority. It called for no special gift
to note and record the concrete events, whatever gifts were needed
to record them beautifully. But to understand thought, thought
new and deep, expressed symbolically, whimsically, mischievously,
trippingly on the tongue, now to this one. now to that, now here,
now there, now touching this matter, now that, did call for an alert-
ness of attention, a keenness of perception, a steadiness of memory,
and an objectivity of judgment not present at Athens, nor indeed
commensurate with man's limited brains yet anywhere ; while to
set it all down as if verbatim was, as shown in a previous chapter,
the attempt either of self-delusion or of literary fiction. We are
shut up forever to reading between the lines and to estimating the
cumulative evidence of innumerable hints, which, taken separately,
we would have no means of testing, and no right to feel sure of.
We can bring the difficulty home to ourselves, if we imagine pos-
terity, without the Essays, dependent for its knowledge of Emer-
son's thought, on (hypothetical) miscellanies of conversation re-
ported and edited by Alcott, Thoreau, Margaret Fuller, and other
neighbors of the Concord apple-trees and pines.
The histories of philosophy, despite the imposing names on
their title pages, mislead us (to borrow the language of Frau Aca-
demia) with the specious clarity of a rationalizing schematismus.
Here just what Socrates repudiated and contributed is numbered
and sectioned and paragraphed with that illuminating precision
which facilitates preparation for the final examination. The studies
of Grote and of Zeller, based upon a wide erudition and developed
with a philosophic grasp it were pedantry to commend, convey also
a misleading impression of certainty, which the contradictory results
of the German scholarship of the last fifteen years, of Doering with
his Xenophontic Socrates, of Joel who clings to Aristotle, of Roeck
who picks his data from portions of Xenophon and from much
indirect and elusive testimony in the attitude of contemporaries or
in the comment of tradition, tends to destroy, without, however,
furnishing any constructive substitution in which we can feel full
confidence. The new critics confuse while they help; and the day
has gone by when even a popular essayist can content himself with
compiling from the old. Tentatively and modestly I will set down
my own opinions, which, I suppose, will differ from those of better
men in lacking the organization and definitiveness that, though
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much to be desired, it is impossible for me with intellectual honesty
to reach.
II.
What thought had been busied with before Socrates is, from
the point of view of its dynamic contributions, far more important
in the case of Plato in whom unite elements of the Eleatic, the Hera-
clitic, and the P)^hagorean speculation, than in the case of his
master who is notorious for his break with the past. From the
point of view of a crisis in the human intellect, however, it is
necessary to make some mention of that thought here. A few
words, then, with the emphasis on antecedents rather than on in-
fluence.
During a generation or two preceding Socrates, in the sea-
washed colonies to east and west had developed a number of the-
ories of universal nature, as free and large and intangible as the
starry heavens and salt winds about them. The search for the univer-
sal explanation of things which had begun in the naive materialistic
monisms of the Milesians, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximines,
as deductions from the apparent omnipresence of water, the at-
mospheric indefinite, or *air, turned, with that sudden acceleration
which characterized Greek progress everywhere in the fifth century,
very shortly to rational analysis of concept and sense-impression
of the phenomenal world. The Eleatics of Magna Graecia, holding
the primacy of reason over sense, discovered the antinomies which
forced them to deny reality to change and plurality ; the first of meta-
physicians, they proclaimed the absolute and pointed a way to scepti-
cism. The great Ephesian, though positing like the physicists of
Miletus, a material principle, fire, as the substratum of the multi-
tudinous visible universe, is chiefly notable for paradoxes, as ana-
lytically derived as those of the Eleatics, which forced him to deny
ultimate and permanent reality to anything but the Logos, the law
of change itself, and to affirm relativity, the absolute instability of
all things, as the inherent logical implication of being
—
pleasure
conditioned by pain, life by death, thesis by anti-thesis. In the
eternal flux there can be no certainty of truth, and Heraclitus, too,
points a way to scepticism.
Pythagoreanism, coming after all pretty close to the intellectual
basis of the world-ground in its doctrine of numbers, however
fantastically applied and involved in that hocus-pocus which so
often has accompanied primitive mathematics, is an esoteric cult
of religious mystics with liturgy and rites.
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Empedocles of Agrigentum, imagining a cosmogony almost as
mythical and arbitrary as that of Hesiod, yet peopling it with eter-
nal substances (earth, air, fire, and water) and eternal principles
of cosmic energy (attraction and repulsion), is, from our point of
view to-day, physicist rather than philosopher. So too chiefly
Anaxagoras of Athens, as far as we can judge, who taught infinite
atoms and a universal mind-stuff.
Contemporary with Socrates off at x\bdera in Thrace Democri-
tus was teaching in numerous books now lost a mechanism of
nature—atoms, motion, and the void—which, with modifications and
extensions and a more elaborate terminology, is the physics and
chemistry of to-day—or at least of yesterday.
These courageous eff'orts to master experience were all pri-
marily directed outward. The challenge came from the majesty
and mystery of the external universe. But in meeting it thought
soon became conscious of its own mystery, and man himself became
part of the problem. In the irremediable flux of Heraclitus and
the cold atomism of Democritus men's minds tend to vanish into
mere sensations differing for each : truth is as multiple as humanity
:
there is no universal principle of knowledge or thinking or conduct
;
man is the measure of all things. So Protagoras, the sophist.
Meantime the later Eleatic, the sophist Gorgias, perhaps in half-
jest, has pushed the dialectic reasoning of the school to the negation
of being itself.
The path is open to absolute scepticism. The exploration of
reason is ending in unreason. Speculation has thus far approached
man from without ; and that way madness lies. It must make a
new start,—with man himself, man in his humble activities and daily
round, irrespective of atoms clashing in the void and theories clash-
ing in the brain. The philosophic implications in the simple mental
life of an Athenian cobbler or saddler or armor-smith may bring
us back to some conviction of permanence and certainty in thought.
Thereafter it will be time enough to look again at the cosmos.
Socrates, beginning and ending with man, ultimately saves Greek
philosophy from self-slaughter. It is not for nothing that he is an
Athenian.
But it is easy to present the situation too academically. Scep-
ticism is troubling a few speculative heads. Their notions are
abroad in Athens, imported over seas in parchment-rolls, well boxed
from the damp salt air, or stalking the streets on the lips of the
traveling professors. They are affecting not only the intellects of
the abstracted, but doubtless the moral conduct of some of the
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active young men ; but that Socrates in his new direction was con-
sciously phrasing a philosophic task, or by saving philosophy was
saving mankind, are propositions which distort both the larger
mission of the sage and the relatively secondary importance of
technically philosophic systems for the public health. From Soc-
rates, as must be noted later, most subsequent Greek schools seem
directly or indirectly to derive. But he was not aiming to reform
philosophy. Nor could his re-formation of philosophy be a revolu-
tion—except in philosophy, a fairly negligible phase of human pro-
gress, if we take into account the few in any age who mull over
its puzzles. No, Socrates's interest was in men and his aim to reform
men ; and, though he doubtless checkmated philosophic nihilism
in more than one aggressive young dupe, he awoke to a sense of
their ignorance and their heritage in the laws of the spirit many
more, less sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought than ailing
from that moral lethargy which still keeps out the kingdom.
It is easy in another matter to misrepresent the situation. It
is not as if philosophy and morals came to a standstill, say about
440, to await help from Socrates. Historians distort the chronology.
Gorgias, Protagoras, and Anaxagoras were teaching in Athens
long after that date, and scepticism itself may not have been full
blown when Socrates began his public work. Direct evidence is
lacking, but there is plausibility in the conjecture that his first con-
versations antedated even the first appearance of the sophists. Gor-
gias, for example, came to Athens in 427, only five years before Soc-
rates was lampooned in the Clouds.
In still a third matter the situation may be misrepresented.
Socrates, during his long life, was not the only teacher at Athens
who held that the proper study of mankind is man. Protagoras
himself laid the stress there, as the logical result of his own scepti-
cism, and the later sophists seem to have occupied themselves en-
tirely with intellectual conduct and with moral conduct, like Socra-
tes, independent, as to the former, of cosmic speculations and, as
to the latter, of mere tradition. They certainly also used the cross-
examining method, associated now with Socrates, on which a word
below. As with Socrates, their business was the education of youth.
But Socrates is a greater sophist—not simply because he tarries
in Athens, and they wander from city to city ; not only because he
teaches in the Agora and they in private homes ; not altogether
because he gives and they sell instruction, nor even because his wis-
dom is humble that it knows no more and their knowledge some-
times proud in that it learned so much
—
greater because of greater
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moral earnestness. There were honest sophists, although contem-
porary writers and later anecdotists testify that some even then
were the unprincipled jugglers with reason that have given the
name its long current and unfortunate association. But none except
Socrates made truth and righteousness the be-all and the end-all. A
greater sophist, also, it need not be added, because a greater intellect
and a greater personality.
And now, if with a little more imagination than poor Wagner,
the student has begun
"Sich in den Geist der Zeiten zu versetzen,
let him attempt
"Zu schauen, wie vor uns ein weiser Mann gedacht."
III.
The thought of Socrates is implicit in his method. He was not
a formal lecturer, as other sophists doubtless were at times, and
as Plato and Aristotle were later. He talked, as all Athens was
talking ; he asked questions, and applied the answers to the business
of further questions, as men had done before and have done ever
since. He utilized on occasion the keener procedure of the dis-
ciplined mind, the dialectic which, applied first by Zeno the Eleatic
to abstract matter and motion, etc., it was now the sophists' service
to apply to human conduct. He shared, I repeat, his cross-examin-
ing method of instruction with the sophists, just as Jesus shared
his parabolic instruction with the rabbis. But like Jesus, by a
powerful originality he made a common device so much his own
that we now connect it only with him.
Aristophanes, as we have seen, represents him as formally
teaching his method, but this appears to be a wilful or reckless
identification of Socrates with his fellow sophists who we know
imparted the art of clever reasoning as a practical instrument,
whereas Socrates, according to all other traditions, used it to im-
part truths beyond itself, teaching method merely by showing it in
operation.
"He conducted discussion by proceeding step by step from one
point of general agreement to another" (Memorabilia, IV, 6), and
"by shredding off all superficial qualities laid bare the kernel of
the matter" (Memorabilia, HI, 2). He begins with the point of
view of his interlocutor or opponent and, with an irony kindly or
irritating according to circumstances and with frequent use of
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homely illustrations, leads him on inductively to one admission after
another, until he sees the implication in his own thought, that is,
until he is face to face with himself as the unwitting possessor of
a particular truth. Each man has within him truth, though as yet
foetal and powerless to be born ; Socrates comes calling himself
the midwife. This was presumably his interpretation of the Del-
phic adage, "know thyself" ; and, far from proud of his midwifery,
he was "eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others" (Mem-
orabilia, IV, 7). He bored deeper into the strata of thought than
the other sophists, and knew better its hidden caverns and springs
;
and, more than they, tapped it for living waters. The intellectus sihi
permissus, "the intellect left to itself,"—the phrase is Bacon's—the
spontaneous reason of haphazard man he strove to make conscious
and self-directive. His aim implied confidence in universals of the
truth of which each individual partook, as well as confidence in
human nature capable of self-salvation.
All our sources indicate that Socrates was unweary in his
inquiries for the rt eom, the What, the essential meaning of a
thing. In Xenophon he appears discriminating, defining. The Pla-
tonic figure is presumably dramatically true to his intellectual atti-
tude. The nub of the satire of the Clouds is rationalizing fanati-
cism corrupting the youth (for which Aristophanes surely should
have borrowed Schopenhauer's Aristophanean coinage applied to
Hegel
—
Windheutelei, windbaggery). And Aristotle says in a fa-
mous passage (Metaphysics, I, 6, 3) that has caused a deal of
trouble: "Socrates discovered inductive discourse and the definition
of general terms," in contrast, as the modern critics point out, to
the mere grammatical distinctions of the sophists. But our critics
have certainly exaggerated what were for Socrates simply short
formularies of the factors to be examined, not logic-proof concepts
of abstract philosophy. My Socrates was not a Begriffsphilosoph,
and would have enjoyed the practical joke of Diogenes (of the
school of Antisthenes, a disciple of the midwife), who, hearing
(as the story goes) of Plato's definition of homo sapiens as a
featherless biped, plucked a rooster and carried it over to the Acad-
emy as an example of Plato's "man."
IV.
But these short formularies of the factors to be examined
were of prime importance. Socrates emphasized the rational, the
cognitive, aspect of vitrue, as no other teacher: ms yap dperas eVi-
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cTT^fia'; IttoUl
—
"He made the virtues knowledges" (Aristotle, Magna
Moralia, I, 1), and since our first historian of philosophy recurs to
the theory at length a dozen times (in all three Ethics), to explain
and refute it, with that modernity and subtilty that forever aston-
ishes us in
"II maestro di color che sanno,"
we must accept it as true at least to one side of Socrates's thought.
Virtue is knowledge. In a sense: "To be pious is to knozv what is
due to the gods ; to be just is to know what is due to men ; to be
courageous is to know what is to be feared and what is not ; to be
temperate is to knozv how to use what is good and avoid what is
evil" {Encycl. Brit.).
Various comments difficult to organize crowd upon us for ex-
pression. What of this dynamic relation between right thinking
and right conduct, between ignorance and evil? How did Socrates
arrive at the idea ? How far did he admit its modification by other
factors in human nature? Has it an element of truth?
The idea, in the first place, were a witness to the character
of Socrates, whom a noble serenity of reason dominated like an
irrefragable god. It were, too, an idea typically Ionic, Athenian,
sprung from that stock which stressed the Aoyo? of life, even as the
ideal of the Doric (Sparta) was the eyK/aaTcta, the 'ipya (deeds).
Socrates saw the actual identity of knowing and being in the
theoretical sciences : to know geometry is to be a geometer. He may
not have appreciated the difference of aim in the practical arts.
He may have said that to know medicine is to be a physician, and
thus have construed conduct itself as the science-art of life, so that
knowing virtue was the same as being virtuous, and he may not have
sufficiently perceived that the aims of the theoretic science are self-
inclusive, and those of the practical arts in every case respective
somewhats beyond themselves.
However, I do not care to push the Aristotelian critique further,
as my imagination is haunted with something like an uncomfortably
reiterated and all but inscrutable chuckle of Socrates that yet seems
to say: "This great man's subtilty and system takes the old beggar
too solemnly. And I didn't reckon in the irrational part of the
soul (aAoyov fiepos i/'^'x^l?) ? ^"^ the will being in my view subser-
vient to thought, the result is determinism? And was the market-
place, then, such a poorly equipped laboratory that my researches
left me so ignorant of the twists and starts and explosions of human
nature? And will he deny the larger implications for systematic
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thought (if he must make me a system) which may be read out of
my deahngs with men?"
Granted that Socrates in speech and practice proceeded from
the proposition to know is to be, applied specifically to conduct
;
granted that like every new and great thought, like the Copernican
astronomy, like Biblical criticism, it was at first formulated too ab-
solutely ; granted that Socrates was not a theoretic psychologist and
that indeed the psychology of the will and the emotions was not very
extensively developed even till long after Aristotle; granted that life
is forever in advance of all speculation upon it and that the first
serious speculations on morals may as such have been an inadequate
or inconsistent phrasing of impulses, motives, and ethical stimulus
obvious even in the veriest honey-smeared brat screaming under
his mother's sandal in an Athenian alley-way: it is yet impossible
to square the thought and service of Socrates entirely with Aris-
totle's report ; it is yet impossible to identify my Socrates entirely
with him of the text-books.
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, said the
adoring Hebrew ; to know the right, as implicit in thy nature, is the
beginning of wisdom, doubtless said the quizzical Greek : each in
his own tongue. Knowledge is the sine qua non: not following a
Pythagorean ritual, not following the Attic sires, not in itself fol-
lowing the laws of the state, but ethical insight. Socrates preached
the self-reliance of an individual moral vision which was yet founded
in universal man.
After the insight, what? For a finely balanced soul, in a sense,
nothing. Insight merges into conduct ; the initial readjustments
of knowledge become, if not considered too curiously by the ana-
lytic psychologist, the readjustments of action ; there is no fight
pending with the world, the flesh, or the devil ; he sees and he forth-
with is what he sees. This was, I think, Socrates's ideal man.
Socrates made less than we do of character up-builded by struggle
and of the glories of doing one's duty against the grain. He was
a Greek ; we are Teutons with a Hebraic education.
Note, however, the condition: "for a finely balanced soul."
Self-control, balance, poise, is the cardinal Socratic virtue. When
present, moral insight is moral conduct. But more than that, its
presence is practically identical with moral insight as well. "Be-
tween wisdom and balance of soul he drew no distinction"
—
ao<f)[av Kal aoxfipocrvvrp' ov Stojpi^ev (Memorabilia, HI, 9) is Xenophon's
comment, and not too much stress is to be laid on the fact that his
word is o-o<^ta (wisdom), not tTnaTrjfirj (knowledge). And in a
^
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neighboring passage, "He said that justice, moreover, and all other
virtue is wisdom."
Is, then, complete insight itself possible without this balance?
If we take Xenophon absolutely, apparently not. Wrong conduct
is either blindness or madness, i. e., either failure of insight or lack
of soul balance ; but these are practically two aspects of the same
thing. Balance of soul, insight, right conduct is the Socratic man-
hood, the not entirely mysterious three-in-one of this pagan anthro-
pologist.
But what of the avowed situation of Ovid's Medea, and of so





Would Socrates have denied the major?—Presumably he would first
have questioned it ; but often enough he was face to face with gifted
men, like Alcibiades, who knew right and did wrong, with intelli-
gent but vicious humanity where the cure, if any, could not be alone
merely more intellectuality. He believed in training soul and body
to self-mastery, not only as right conduct in itself but as the pre-
requisite for right thinking and right conduct (cf. Memorabilia,
IV, 5). This is potent to any one who reads between the lines of
our sources ; and has perceived that Socrates's identification of dif-
ferent factors, is, if anything, more than an insistence on the pri-
mary importance of moral cognition, but an immortal hyperbole of
an original mind, not busied with a formal system, and not bothered
by its inconsistencies, as when perhaps he said "courageous men
are those who have knowledge to cope with terrors and dangers well
and nobly," the adverbs seeming to imply the recognition of traits
of character antecedent to the knowledge.
He recognized, though he may never have formulated, back of
self-control, insight, and conduct, the facts of temperament and
environment, without wavering in practice from his belief in the
relative teachability of virtue analogous to the teaching of a trade
or art. He does not, however, seem to have valued over-much
teaching through the emotions. There are hints that he more than
once stirred the emulous heart by noble examples cited, but the oft
mentioned enthusiasm of his listeners was roused usually either bv
his sweet reasonableness or the unplanned and unmediated effect
of his own brave and kindly personality. Of the blazing passion,
in plea or threat, of Mohammed and the Hebrew prophets, or of the
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austere yet plangent appeal of the loving Jesus there is not a trace.
There are many different voices for the schooling of man.
The new pedagogy stands quite across the world from where
Socrates stood. With its experiments on the ethical emotions of
cats and dogs, its statistics of innocent nursery prayers and
depravities, its questionnaires on the moral agitations at puberty,
and its roll-calls of public pensioners in Sing Sing or Fort Leaven-
worth, it has all but demonstrated the negligibility of knowing as a
factor in virtue. And the parlor-philosopher, calling Sunday after-
noon, shakes his head and assures me there is no connection be-
tween education and morality. Sad. And true, possibly, if by
knowing we mean knowing mathematics and by education education
in linguistics or the new pedagogy; verbiage, if we mean knowing
moral values. The intellectual is still fundamental, and great char-
acter is still impossible without just thought as a big block in the
underpinning. Meantime the common sense of mankind is rather
with Socrates at bottom than with the new pedagogy, unconsciously
testifying something of its unshaken view-point in countless familiar
turns of speech : "Know the right and do it ;" "You ought to knozv
better;" "Poor fellow, he didn't know how disgraceful his actions
were ;" "What could you expect from a man who never had a chance
to know the ideals of good citizenship ;" "You're wrong, can't you
see it?" etc., etc., all of which adumbrate the cognitive (without
psychologizing it away from the imagination) and neglect the emo-
tional altogether, as dynamic for conduct.
Kant founded the moral life in the good will ; Socrates in
right thinking. Yet each implies the factor made paramount by the
other: Kant says act so that the maxim of thy conduct is fit to be-
come universal law and implies the rationalizing, generalizing, judg-
ing, knowing mind; Socrates says a man without self-control is
little better than the beasts, and implies that energy of soul to which
modern psychology gives the name will. A worthy moral life is
impossible without both, but the romantic ethical tendencies of to-
day need the propaedeutic of Socrates more than of Kant. The
good will we have always with us, giving often enough, with ghastly
best wishes, unwittingly a serpent for a fish and a stone for bread
;
but the intelligence to see the practical bearings of conduct and to
discriminate between higher and lower ideals is too often lacking
—
to the dwarfing of the individual and to the confusion of society.
The fool in Sill's poem (which goes deep) prayed not for the good
will, but for wisdom ; and therefore the less fool he.
Socrates associateed aperrj, "virtue," with some further ideas
^
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more prominent in his thought than would be presumed from the
brief mention that can here be made of them.
He was, I beheve, an incorrigible utilitarian. The measure of
any thing's worth was to him in its adaptation to use. But after
all, the crux is in the content of use ; and Socrates recognized only
noble uses. Reason as we will, we cannot reason away his implicit
idealism: such and such conduct is useful—for what—for making
you useful to the state, a brave soldier? for making you worth
while to yourself, self-respecting? "But what the use?" We can
not go far without standing before the mystery of the approving
or condemning moral consciousness itself. Socrates appears never
to have thought the matter out; nor need we just here. In spite
of his rationalistic bent, he accepted as instinctively as most men
the obligation to the ideal.
He preached companionship ; and boasted himself to be both
lover and the pander too. "I am an adept in love's lore". . . .the
disciples "will not suffer me day or night to leave them, forever
studying to learn love-charms and incantations at my lips." These
words are found not in Plato's Symposium, but in the prosaic narra-
tive of Xenophon, whose placidity in assuring us in another passage
that "all the while it was obvious the going forth of his soul was not
towards excellence of body in the bloom of beauty, but rather
towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue." is a good indi-
cation that we have here an element of the historic Socrates. But
friendship was founded on character: "In whatsoever you desire
to be esteemed good, endeavor to be good" (Memorabilia, II, 6) ;
to be a good friend, you must be a good man. Love was also fellow-
service: the good friend tried to make his friend better. On the
other hand, it was useful to acquire friends—they were the best
possessions. The politic utilitarian peeps out again. But useful
for what?—for the cult of generous helpers, for the freemasons of
the Good. We come round again and again to the center of the
Socratic utilitarianism which measured finally the useful things in
the moral realm by their usefulness for the ideal manhood. I have
employed the vilified name for rhetorical surprise. It has here little
in common with its use in modern philosophy, though modern utili-
tarians have been too ready to exclaim, "Lo, he has become as one
of us."
Socrates would not have been a Greek if his ethics had not
had a social and political reference. Ideal manhood and ideal
citizenship would have been for practical teaching one thing to him.
He would have been hugely impressed with the adroit patience and
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clever tinkering amid loneliness and deprivation of Robinson Cru-
soe; he would have admitted doubtless that the brooding, skinclad
sailor v^as not without some insight and some self-control which
is of virtue ; but for Socrates he would have lacked both the main
opportunities and the main ends of good conduct : a state of fellow
men. Thus the Athenian stands in almost brutal contrast to those
gentle hermits of the inner life who have in times past peopled the
caves of Egypt and the crags of the Himalayas.
This is clear for instance in the emphasis he seems to have
put upon the ideal of a leader, the man best equipped to manage
something, whether the drilling of a chorus for the theater, or the
marshalling of soldiers into battle, or the ruling of a commonwealth.
Some aspects of this ideal are to be sure extra-ethical. The
Greek aperrj means human excellence, Tuchtigkeit, efficiency, with
or without what we would call an ethical connotation, and it illus-
trates that differing focus of thought, that differing idea-group,
that differing line of cleavage that so often strikes the student of
a foreign tongue. I have not hesitated, however, heretofore, to
translate it "virtue," for it is its aspect of moral efficiency that is
so prominent in Socrates, though its absolute sense of simple effi-
ciency doubtless tended in his thinking to specious analogies. Our
word "good" offers a modern parallel, both in its double sense and
in its sometimes ambiguous and misleading use in thought.
Socrates would not have been a Greek if he had not empha-
sized the sanctity of the sovereign laws as a guiding principle of
conduct. The Greeks often spoke as if the state were the end of
man; that is, as if man received his justification only in so far as
he contributed to its perfection. That a state is but the wise com-
munal means to opportunity, variety, unfoldment, manhood, of the
only earthly reality that counts, individual human beings, is scarcely
the point of departure of Plato's Republic or even of Aristotle's
Politics, but is the result of a long development in political science,
fascinating, but irrelevant here. Just how far Socrates failed to
see it as we do, we have no certain knowledge. It is, however, on
several grounds, to be confidently presumed that he derived the
sanction of the civil law from justice, and not as is often declared,
justice from the law. In the corrupt and shifting politics of Athens
there were laws which he condemned and deliberately disobeyed
in the interests of higher laws. And he would have taken coura-
geously by the arm the Sophoclean Antigone, as she determined to
bury her brother Polyneices in spite of the state decree, and have
said, "Thou art right, my child ; indeed,
^
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'The life of these laws is not of to-day,
Or yesterday; but from all time, and, lo,
Knoweth no man when first they were
put forth.'"
V.
That Socrates conceived the laws of right thinking and doing
as organic and not statntory, as not imposed from without but as
implicated in the nature of the organism and as universal as man
seems clear from the general tendency and headway of his teach-
ings. A ship may tack more than once in its course, but we meas-
ure the meaning and purpose of the voyage correctly only when
we have absorbed the casual deviations into a more comprehensive
cartography. His conception of virtue has the transcendental im-
plication ; it roots in a beyond ; conceptually, in the universality of
the ideal : categorically, in his naive and unexamined assumption
of man's sense of obligation to the ideal when discovered.
This is the thoroughfare from ethics to religion. When the
soul, finally conscious of that transcendental implication (though
it be named more simply, or named not at all), and awake with
rejoicing or dismay to the realization that virtue streams ultimately
from the shining foreheads of the gods, it perforce reaches out
with trust or prayer. It becomes Micah uttering the finality: "He
hath showed thee. O man, what is good : and what doth the Lord
require of thee, but to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk
humbly with thy God." Nor is the essential attittide altered if
for his bafifled spirit the Divine Singular or Plural merges into the
Infinite Mystery that rebukes our petty vocabularies. There is no
other highway. The philosophic reason that, examining the tran-
scendental bearings of logic and nature, arrives at a world-ground,
arrives only at the intellectual last, at the speculative satisfaction,
which, though it may bulwark religion, can scarcely compel it. The
feeling of physical helplessness or dependence or terror, the sug-
gestions of spirit-things from dream or hallucination, or eery winds
or nodding tree, may issue in beliefs with incantations and petitions
and burnt offerings, reachings out to a Superior or a Host, but this
is religion only in the Lucretian sense, denying often enough even
the majesty of man himself
—
"Tantum religio potuit suadere maloriim."
A not ignoble morality is possible, uncompanioned by the
reaching out which merges it with religion ; but religion (apart
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from anthropological investigation) gives over not only its dignity
and its beauty, but even its meaning if sundered from exalted
morality.
If to Socrates was not revealed the transcendental implication
of his life, if Socrates reached not out for the justification and
sustenance of his ethic towards a Divine, then Socrates, though
at the temple door, and though a servant there who worked right-
eousness and thus, according to bluff and honest Peter, also accept-
able to Him, was still not a teacher of religion. His character,
his service would remain lofty memorial of humanity, lofty witness
of a god unknown ; but he were still not a religious mind. This if
we have yet to consider.
It becomes more and more plausible that the fatal indictment
is rooted in observed fact: "Socrates is guilty of not worshiping
the gods whom the city worships." If he had been initiated into
the Eleusinian mysteries at that time newly popular, his apologists
would have risen forthwith against the dicasts. Plato's Apology
practically dodged this charge of the indictment. Aristophanes,
years before, had formulated it, and we cannot any longer throw
Aristophanes peremptorily out of court as a mere irresponsible
buffoon in an ugly temper. Satire makes no appeal unless it phrases
a common belief: there would be nothing fetching about a satire
on Roosevelt as an atheist, or on Emerson as a hunter and rough-
rider, except as a cheaply comic inversion of well-known habits
and traits, and Aristophanes was hardly perpetrating that sort of
jest. His satire on the sordidness of the school-house was founded
on the fact of the poor and mean estate of Socrates's person ; his sat-
ire on the Socratic speculations was founded in the fact of Socrates's
perpetual rationalizing; his satire on the corruption of youth on
the fact of Socrates's influencing young meri to think new thoughts
unprescribed by the elders ; and his satire on Socrates's irreligion
must likewise have been founded on fact—misunderstood fact,
possibly, but fact misunderstood only as most of Athens may have
misunderstood it. The Socrates of Plato, perhaps, helps us little
;
but it is to be observed that his remarks on dreams, oracles and
the gods have an elusive playfulness or poetry, pointing if point-
ing at all beyond Plato, to a mind rather mischieviously at ease
in Zion, but not hostile to contemporary beliefs only because so
far above them; and that his beautiful prayer to "Pan and ye
other gods who frequent this spot" asks, quite contrary to popular
petition, "in the first place to be good within" ; and that the nearer
Plato's Socrates seems to approach historic reality the more his
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religious allusions approach the indefinite "Divine," and the more
eloquent is the expression of the moral law. The movement of
thought with which Socrates was most nearly associated was away
from the folk religion. Socrates was so much with Euripides,
the infidel poet of the Enlightenment, that rumor accused him of
dramatic collaboration. The chorus at the end of the Frogs—
a
satire on that poet—sings with meaning: "Hail to him who [unlike
Euripides] neither keeps company nor gossips with Socrates." And
again, the keen intelligence of Socrates, as we have tried to analyze
him, consorts awkwardly with the popular Olympians.
Against all this, we have the explicit testimony of the Mem-
orabilia : Socrates was the most orthodox son of the state religion
;
the pillar and deacon of the church ; the ambling odor of sanctity,
now closeted with this priest now with that, running about from
altar to altar with incense and winecup or telling his beads to
every saint in the calendar. We share Xenophon's own puzzlement
that the state could have condemned to death such a simple-minded
old gentleman for impiety.
But this was not the man they condemned. As suggested in
the first chapter, it was almost a formula with Xenophon, when
he admired a man (and he had in excess the goodly gift of ad-
miration) to extol him for the piety and pious practices which played
a dominant part in the eulogist's own life. That he deliberately
grafted these domestic pieties upon Socrates is impossible ; if he
had conceived Socrates as the impious neglecter or defamer of
the gods, he would have been the last to attach himself or to rise
in defense of the man. But that he absurdly misconstrued him
seems patent. Socrates shared, as no other teacher, the life of his
city ; and the religious rites were so closely associated with folk-
habits that he may well have attended them from time to time in
the satisfaction of the social instinct of man. He may well not
have sloughed off some deep-rooted ancestral prejudices : even
Emerson raised his hands with the dismay of all his Puritan sires
when he discovered the children in the house playing battledore
and shuttlecock one Sabbath morn. He may well have used often
enough the current coin of speech, in Greek, as in all languages full
of conventional religious phrases. But it was not alone in whatever
unconscious relations Socrates may have maintained to the state
religion that Xenophon misconstrued him. The profounder inter-
ests and ideas and temperament of Socrates he equally misread.
Socrates visited everybody and studied everywhere: but he was
not necessarily more a hierophant for visiting a seer than he was
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a shoemaker for visiting a cobbler. "When any one came seeking
for help which no human wisdom could supply, he would counsel
him to give heed to divination" (Memorabilia, IV, 7) : the Socratic
irony Xenophon presumably never half mastered. And, again, if
Xenophon had asked him if he believed in Zeus and Athene and
Apollo, he would doubtless have said yes. without hypocrisy, but
also without explaining the ethnic period which lay between Xeno-
phon's meaning of belief and his own. I myself believe in those
resplendent deities. The fact is that religious narrowness always
naively interprets the religious life of another by its own, unless
kept back by clubs and spears. Give it the salute of mere human
recognition, and it claims you for its sect. I have heard of an old
lady who was moved by the orthodoxy of "that devout man, Mr.
Gibbon." Joseph Cook, after an impertinent pilgrimage to Con-
cord, announced so blatantly his conversion of Emerson that the
family finally caused a printed denial to be circulated. The evange-
list's methods were sometimes disingenuous ; but here he seems
merely to have fallen victim to his fatuity. The apostle probably
asked: "Mr. Emerson, do you believe in sin? in salvation? in the
saviour? in rewards and punishments? in the scriptures?" And
the patient heathen as probably nodded a winsome assent of infinite
detachment. I used to see at Cambridge my revered teacher William
James crossing over every morning at nine o'clock to the brief chapel
exercises in the yard, and have heard him both commended and
ridiculed by students who equally misconceived the simplicity and
depth of that analytic yet brooding mind.
But we are approaching a point of view. If Xenophon cannot
be taken literally, he adumbrates a positive truth. If Socrates was
not religious in the folk-sense, he was religious in a higher sense.
He did recognize the transcendental implication. Even Xenophon
now and then seems to have caught his larger phrase: "His for-
mula of prayer was simple—Give me that which is best for me."
And it is difficult to imagine Plato making an absolute atheist even
the dramatic protagonist of an ethical philosophy in which the tran-
scendental implication is consciously conceived as fundamental. But
much further it seems impossible to go. Socrates recognized the
divine foundation and sanction of the moral law, whether he ever
uttered the argument from design so rhetorically developed by
Xenophon or not. But the rest is silence. Whether he held to one
divine being, as is not unlikely ; and whether immortality was more
than the high hope of the Apology, as seems doubtful—we can not
report. An early tradition tells of a Hindu conversing with Soc-
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rates (and it is not historically impossible that some soldier from
the Indus, impressed into the Persian armies, remained in Greece,
as exile or slave, after the defeat). And he said, "Tell me, Soc-
rates, what is the substance of your teaching?" "Human affairs."
"But you can not know human affairs if you don't know first the
divine." Socrates, though no Oriental, may have assented in his
own fashion. Yet the tradition hints at the true situation. He
proclaimed the nobility of man, rather than the decrees of a god.
He found the divine written in the human heart and brain, not on
tablets of stone in the mountains. He came with no avowed revela-
tion ; he burned with no wrath against the folk-religion ; he inaugu-
rated no specifically religious reform. He was a messenger, a
ministrant, a saviour, whose ethical idealism in word and conduct
had its conscious religious aspect ; but he was not primarily a
religious leader. Mohammed passed from Allah down to man
;
it was man who led Socrates on to Zeus.
Yet the indictment went on to accuse him of introducing gods
of his own. Of this there is no evidence in the sense apparently
intended. Plato makes Meletus call Socrates during the trial "a
complete atheist" ; and, when Meletus hung up the indictment he
was either wilfully lying or but stating an assumed corollary to
what was possibly to him the sum of atheism—denial of the city's
gods. Or the historic kernel may be to seek in Socrates's modes of
thinking and speaking about the Divine. What's in a name?
Everything for popular thought. Emerson's "Brahma" is to many
people either a meaningless or a blasphemous poem ; change the name
to "God" and they would paste it in their hymn-books. Describe
with all science and beauty the life-habits and appearance of a
flower, and then halt in a momentary slip of memory, and your
amateur botanist supposes you an ignoramus because you can't
name it. For most people a rose, if named Symplocarpus foetidus,
would not smell as sweet. H the originality of Socrates ever in-
vented new names for divine things, that would have been sufficient
grounds for his enemies to suspect him of inventing new divinities
;
just as his use at other times of familiar names seems to have been
a good ground for such friends as Xenophon to suppose him
orthodox. For the rest, to me this specification in the indictment
is but one more proof that the Socratic message of righteousness
was often enough verbally associated with the transcendental im-
plication. For, when we say that Socrates was not primarily a
religious teacher we do not forget that he was put to death partially




Xenophon refers the charge to a misunderstanding of the dai-
monion which, according to common tradition, Socrates often men-
tioned as his warning voice or sign. Whether this explanation be
in line with a hint in the preceding paragraph or not, may be left
to the reader. We are forced, however, to examine the phenom-
enon in itself. What was the daimonion (to 8at/^onov) ? The ques-
tion is double: what was it to Socrates? what is it for us? Though
Socrates seems to have treated it, or pretended to treat it, somewhat
like a familiar spirit or good genius, the word has properly no
personal or theological meaning. Euripides and Thucydides, both
men of the Enlightenment, use it of that which, given by fate, man
must adjust himself toward and to. It was not synonymous with
"demon" ; Cicero rightly translated it divinum quiddam (De divina-
tione, I, 54, 122). To Socrates it may have been a literal voice,
sounding in the inner ear. Not alone visionaries like Joan of Arc
and Swedenborg, have heard voices : Pascal and Luther heard them,
though the former was the shrewdest intellect and the latter the
soundest stomach of his age, and both men rooted on solid earth.
If so, we turn the problem over to the psychologists—without, how-
ever, implying the neurotic decadence that becomes the business
of the alienist. And they may name it a manifestation of the tran-
scendental ego, or an instance of double personality, or an objectifi-
cation of an unusually developed instinct of antipathy or of an
abhorrent conscience, a non-rational residuum in the most rational-
istic of men. Or to Socrates it may have been but a playful mode
of referring to his disapproval of whatnots of conduct, ethical or
otherwise, a disapproval reasoned out or immediately felt. The sug-
gestion, tentative as it is, is still not an arbitrary assimiliation of
an ancient mind to modern rationalism. We know the ironic habit
of Socrates, ironic not only toward others, but, with that deeper
wisdom, ironic toward himself. We know he was given to playful
exaggeration, especiall}' to quizzical tropes. His pedagogic method
he called midwifery ; his faculty for friendship and for bringing
friends together he referred to as incantations or pandering, using
the most erotic expressions, which, in literal use, referred to things
often even from the Greek point of view immoral ; so too he seems
to have spoken of his mantic, his oracular power, meaning simply
foresight or premonition. The conception of the mind and temper
of Socrates to which I have come inclines me to number the dai-
monion also among the tropes.
Again, if we take the Daimonion literally, what of the Dog?
The Platonic Socrates is found of enforcing his asseverations by a
THE THOUGHT OF SOCRATES. 243
blasphemous canine oath, which sounds Hke a historic reminiscence
and may hint at another source of the charge of impiety and new
divinities. "By the Dog they would" (Phaedo) ; "By the Dog, Gor-
gias, there will be a great deal of discussion before we get at the
truth of all this" (Gorgias) ; "Not until, by the Dog, as I beheve, he
had simply learned by heart the entire discourse" (Phaedrus) ; and
"By the Dog" he swears again in the Charmides, in the Lysis, and
in the Republic. By what Dog? Molossian hound or Xanthippe's
terrier? or some Egyptian deity that barks, not bellows? or Cer-
berus? More like. Strange and gruesome idolatry, which troubled
some patristic admirers of the old pagan, as much as the cock his
dying gasp bade sacrifice to Asclepius.
.
